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Abstract: In this paper hypotheses concerning the success of digital market places for 
agricultural inputs and products are tested. The hypotheses were derived from transaction cost 
considerations. Success of digital market places was measured in two ways: (i) the probability 
for a digital marketplaces to survive the competition from conventional and other digital market 
places and (ii) various metrics of market activity such as the number of hits received, number of 
incoming links, and page views per visitor session. Data were obtained from a survey of 233 
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1  Introduction 
Buying and selling means communicating and the advent of any new and revolutionary 
communication technology gives rise to new forms of trading. The great European trading 
houses in the middle ages benefited from the arrival of paper and the great commodity 
exchanges got most of their business by wire. No wonder that the arrival of the internet and the 
web aroused the spirits of market-making entrepreneurs to an extent that has no precedent in 
living memory and which resulted in the installation on the World Wide Web of a large number 
of digital markets intended to facilitate and to profit from trade in agricultural inputs and 
outputs. 
Entrepreneurship generates the mutants for an evolving economy and rare is the mutant that is 
well adapted to its environment and purpose. Digital markets are the new mutants of organized 
market places and the grim reaper of competition struck many of them down when the dot.com 
bubble burst in early 2002, However, what was a disaster for many digital markets is an 
opportunity for market research because opportunities where many organized markets are 
created and abandoned within a relatively short period are rare. 
In this paper I report research aimed at identifying success factors – perhaps failure factors 
would be more appropriate in this instance - for digital markets places in the agricultural and 
food industry. My paper comprises five sections. After the introduction I discuss the expected 
impact of trading in an organized market on the web on the transaction cost of buyers and sellers 
and on the returns for the entrepreneurs who organized such markets. From this discussion I 
derive several hypotheses for empirical testing, In section 3 I briefly describe how I collected 
my data, I discuss a complication for data analysis that appears to be specific for the web, and I 
present some results that I consider both interesting and important. Section 4 closes my 
presentation. 
 
2  Transaction costs and digital market places 
Some organized market places may have come into existence as spontaneously emerged 
institutions. Most market places are, however, organized markets in the sense that they have 
been organized by some individual or group of entrepreneurs who hoped to profit from the 
investment in the installation of a digital market place on the web. Because most digital market 
place compete with established, conventional market places for patronage and trading volume, 
their creators must have hoped to become competitive either by providing trading services at 
lower cost than established markets or to allow buyers or sellers to reach trading partners who 
are beyond their reach on established markets. Both effects can be translated into trading cost 
and, more specifically, transaction cost arguments. 
Define trading costs TCij of trader i when trading with trader j as the sum of transaction costs 
TACij and transport costs TPij: TCij = TACij + TPij. Most agricultural and food products are 
physical goods which cannot be transported by the internet and their transport costs are 
unaffected when they are traded on the internet instead of on conventional markets. Hence, it is 
safe to assume that per unit transport cost on the TP
web are equal to per unit transport cost in 
conventional trading TP
c and transport costs may not deter us any longer. 
Transaction costs are the costs of exchanging ownership titles (Demsetz 1968), or, what amounts 
to the same thing, the costs of using the price mechanism (Coase 1937). In line with this 
understanding North (1990, p. 27) defined transaction costs as the resource inputs and capital 
involved in "defining, protecting, and enforcing property rights to goods". More operational 
definitions of transaction costs usually refer to the phases of an exchange transaction. Thus 
Coase (1988) observed "In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who   3
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to 
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on and, according 
to Coase, "Dahlman crystallized the concept of transaction costs by describing them as 'search 
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.'" Barzel 
(1982), in contrast, emphasizes the costs of measuring product characteristics and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) distinguish two main components of transaction costs: coordination costs and 
motivation costs. The former comprise the costs entailed by searching for a trading partner, 
making contact and negotiating the terms of exchange and motivation costs are the sum of the 
costs arising from incomplete and asymmetric information and the cost arising from incomplete 
commitment. Demsetz (1968), finally, also regards as transaction costs losses from a lack of 
market liquidity. In summary, transaction costs are here considered to consist of the costs of (a) 
information, (b) lack of market liquidity, (c) transaction execution, and (d) transaction risks. 
With the major components of transaction costs identified, we may now speculate how the 
internet affects specific transaction cost components in order to arrive at some empirically 
testable hypothesis. As is well known, the World Wide Web allows its users to communicate 
large amounts of multimedia data over large distances at very high speed. Using the web, traders 
may therefore attempt to reduce the costs of all transaction activities that require the processing 
and communication of information, such as searching for trading partners, describing products, 
negotiating the terms of exchange or communicating billing and shipping data.  
The web has, however, some characteristics that may cause transaction costs to rise. A major 
disadvantage of trading on the web is the anonymity of traders. As a by now paradigmatic 
cartoon had it, nobody on the internet knows you are a dog. Trade in physical products among 
traders separated by distance is always an exchange of promises and nobody has much 
confidence in the promises of dogs. The costs of transaction execution and transaction risks may 
therefore be higher on digital market places than on conventional markets unless market 
organizers succeed in somehow infusing trust into web-mediated transactions among complete 
strangers.  
Trading on the web may also have cost disadvantages when trading volume is low. Installing a 
market place on the web requires a substantial investment whereas the operating costs are low 
compared to the investment costs. Average costs for the operator of a web market place 
therefore fall over a wide range of trading volume. Traders also benefit from large volumes 
because of the higher liquidity of busy market places. Both pronounced economies of scale and 
benefits from market liquidity are barriers to entry which put new web markets at a disadvantage 
compared to established markets. 
Finally, digital market places require that a complex information infrastructure is in place, that 
traders are adept in using it and that the law has been adapted to accommodate the new way of 
trading, in short, that e-commerce readiness has been achieved. 
It would be futile to generate hypotheses without taking into account the availability of 
empirical data. In contrast to conventional markets, which, in many countries, are closely 
observed by government agencies and private market reporting services, digital market places 
often operate behind impenetrable access controls. Data on market volumes, numbers of 
transaction concluded, and prices paid are therefore hard or impossible to obtain from digital 
market places. However, digital market places, in contrast to their conventional counterparts, 
leave traces on large data banks which are accessible to outsiders. Particularly useful is the web 
archive at www.archive.org, where large sections of the internet are stored periodically. 
Furthermore, services are available that provide measurements on certain characteristics of 
websites, such as number of visitors, number of links pointing at a website, that may also be 
useful to describe digital market places.   4
Based on the transaction costs considerations and taking data availability into account, the 
following hypotheses were posited: 
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Variables  expected direction of 
influence on success 
















dynamic pricing  auction tool  + 
e-readiness  several e-readiness indicators  + 
concentration on market 
transaction; no additional general 
information 
offerings of information or news on website  - 




mechanisms to assess traders reputation 







liquidity enforcing activities  time online 
start-up company  







2.1  Power-Law Distribution 
Newer research on statistical web analysis has shown that on the internet power-law 
distributions are dominant. Adamic and Huberman (1999, p. 4) for example have indicated in a 
study with AOL-Users that only 0.1% (1%) of all internet sites will capture 32.36% (55.63) of 
all hits by users. A 2003 executed survey of German agricultural websites confirmed this 
phenomenon (Clasen and Müller, 2003); 1% (5%) of all agricultural sites monitored by the 
website www.land24.de received 24.08 (60.21) of all hits. Huberman (2001, p. 25) regards the 
power law distribution as "… a robust empirical regularity found in all studies of the Web."  
A population of websites that follows a power law with respect to the number of links or hits, 
has several interesting properties: The average number of links or hits received is not typical for 
the population of sites, the distribution of links or hits is scale free, and the population contains a 
small number of sites that are of the "Winner-Takes-All" kind. 
The average number of links is not typical because power law distributions are skewed, have 
long tails, and are not symmetric around a modus or mean. They are scale free in the sense that 
the distribution looks the same at different size intervals of its scale. In this context, Broder et al. 
(2000) perceive "an almost fractal like quality" in that the power law appears both as a 
"macroscopic phenomenon on the entire web, as a microscopic phenomenon at the level of a 
single university website, and at intermediate levels between these two."  
To get proper results in the hypotheses testing, these results have to be taken into account.  
   5
3  Data 
Collecting data on digital market places required first to search for digital market places on the 
web an then to observe certain characteristics of the markets found.  
Digital market places were defined as virtual locations in an electronic data network in which 
several suppliers and several buyers meet to trade specific agricultural or food commodities or 
services, whereby the provider of the markets acquires the ownership of the products at no time. 
Searching the literature, newsletters, trade magazines, and the web for digital markets yielded 
524 candidate markets. The candidates were visited and checked to decide whether they truly are 
digital markets. 233 markets passed muster of which 177 still existed in July 2003. In contrast to 
conventional markets which are unobservable when dissolved, digital markets are conserved on 
the website www.archive.org even after they have gone out of business and this archive 
provided us with most of the data needed for both the existing and the 56 markets that have been 
abandoned. In contrast to many other studies of success factors, which usually have to rely on 
data of surviving enterprises, data on enterprises that have failed are also included in this study. 
As a first measure of success the binary variable ‘existence’ acts, surveyed by calling up the 
URL of each market site. Because a first look at the data has indicated, that many of the still 
existing markets (observed existence) are showing no sign of life, all markets with no change in 
the HTML coding within the last 12 months are also regarded as dead (corrected existence). 
Because of the absence of reliable financial figures for every market, publicly available traffic 
data are used to measure the success of the digital markets on an metric scale, knowing that a 
high traffic on a market is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic success. 
The traffic measures are the number of incoming links, number of hits and number of page 
views per session. These data are achieved by the internet toolbar alexa.com and the search 
engine google.com.  
4  Results 
To test the hypotheses two regression analyses were calculated. First the success measure 
‘existence’ is tested by a logistic regression and second the metric measures number of incoming 
links, number of hits and number of page views per session are tested in a linear regression. In a 
first step a factor analysis was calculated to eliminate some critical multicollinearity. 
Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression for both the observed and corrected existence 
of digital marketplaces. It is visible that a start-up strategy and the offering of information and 
news on a marketplace site affects the probability of surviving significantly negative. Also the 
offering of agricultural output has a lightly significant negative influence and announcing vacant 
jobs a positive effect. All other variables are not significant. 
Having determined what influences the probability for a digital marketplace to survive in 
competition, table 3 shows what factors are influencing the traffic on a market site. As the first 
two double columns show, the differences between the double log reach and the log reach are 
only small. In both cases fees affects the number of hits negatively, whereas the language 
English, exotic languages, the offering of agricultural machines, jobs and a high number of still 
existing months have a significant positive affect. The calculation with not logarithmic reach 
leads to the design of ‘ebay’, as the prototype of a successful marketplace, with risk reducing 
features, no information or news, price setting by auction, jobs and longtime online. Without the 
case ‘ebay’ the results are completely different. This phenomenon shows the importance of 
consideration of the power-law distribution in the web, making logarithms of the dependent 
variable necessary.  The success measure ‘number of incoming links’ shows very similar results to the measure 
‘reach’. The model with ‘pages, visited per session’ as dependent variable is not significant (R² 
= 0,214). 
Table 2: Factors of influence in respect of the probability of surviving 
 observed  existence 
 
-2 Log likelihood            108,222 
Cox & Snell R Square     ,140 
Nagelkerke R Square  ,252 
corrected existence 
 
-2 Log likelihood  195,162 
Cox & Snell R Square  ,165 
Nagelkerke R Square  ,221 
F = Factor  B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 1,531 ,043 ,414  ,421
F: e-readiness  -,057 ,869 -,278  ,220
F: risk reducing tasks  -,019 ,954 -,291 ,178
F: Romanic languages  ,261 ,480 -,111  ,559
F: fees  -,451 ,163 -,228  ,282
F: electronic data exchange  ,354 ,367 -,356  ,137
F: Nordic languages  -,031 ,927 -,443  ,116
F: start-up company   -,803 ,035 -,566  ,011
English ,954 ,152 ,387  ,394
exotic languages  ,584 ,646 ,846 ,276
information & news  ,279 ,618 -,801  ,040
auction -,561 ,324 -,222  ,587
agric. machinery  -1,005 ,197 -,377  ,475
agric. inputs  -,617 ,476 -,263  ,687
agric. outputs  -,494 ,445 -,856  ,091
cattle -,073 ,932 ,303  ,596
trade goods  -,191 ,806 ,028  ,956
misc. goods  -,184 ,757 ,383  ,348
jobs 19,975 ,998 1,228  ,077
number of products ,111 ,113 -,020  ,597
market size  -,144 ,851 ,393  ,393
 
 
Table 3: Factors of influence in respect of reach, page-views and links 
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(reach * 1000) 








 all  cases 
 
R² = 0,463 
adj. R² = 0,350 
all cases 
 
R² = 0,507 
adj. R² = 0,403 
without eBay 
 
R² = 0,453 
adj. R² = 0,337 
all cases 
 
R² = 0,302 
adj. R² = 0,188 
without eBay 
 
R² = 0,236 
adj. R² = 0,111 
all cases 
 
R² = 0,214 
adj. R² = 0,049 
all cases 
 
R² = 0,437 
adj. R² = 0,312 
  Beta  Sig.  Beta Sig. Beta  Sig.  Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
(Constant)      ,000     ,000    ,000  ,342  ,073     ,000   ,002
F: e-readiness  ,063  ,494 ,069 ,431 ,082 ,374 -,012 ,894 ,081 ,383 ,061 ,579 ,065 ,505
F: risk reducing 
tasks  -,064 ,421 -,024  ,753  -,119 ,147 ,261 ,001 -,066 ,440 ,172  ,078 ,004 ,963
F: Romanic 
languages  -,010  ,903 -,021 ,786  -,049 ,544 ,045 ,564 -,079 ,336 ,112 ,242  -,035 ,670
F: fees  -,170  ,056 -,141  ,098  -,155 ,085 -,036 ,680 -,042 ,649 ,094 ,378  -,156 ,089
F: electronic data 
exchange  -,077  ,351 -,093 ,240  -,063 ,450 -,101 ,210 -,017 ,837 -,023 ,816  -,021 ,816
F: Nordic languages  -,070  ,373 -,100 ,186  -,085 ,288 -,073 ,345 -,040 ,617 -,069 ,469  -,209 ,013
F: start-up company   -,077  ,352 -,064 ,422  -,089 ,289 ,049 ,540 -,047 ,583 -,039 ,697 ,098 ,262
English  ,317  ,000 ,295  ,001  ,350 ,000 -,052 ,557 ,233 ,013 ,239  ,026  ,281 ,003
exotic languages  ,229  ,012 ,264  ,003  ,299 ,001 -,032 ,718 ,131 ,167 ,053 ,624 ,061 ,529
information & news  -,071 ,374 -,125  ,106  -,092 ,260 -,170 ,036 -,162 ,059 ,016 ,870 ,090 ,283
auction  ,096 ,251 ,100  ,211  ,063 ,457 ,148 ,070 -,012 ,890 -,087 ,385 ,032 ,718
agric. machinery  ,227  ,039 ,190  ,072  ,247 ,027 -,126 ,243 ,119 ,294 ,237  ,075 -,089 ,466
agric. inputs  -,095  ,479 -,107 ,404  -,083 ,538 -,104 ,398 ,095 ,461 ,052 ,747 ,110 ,444
agric. outputs  -,161  ,130 -,144 ,157  -,169 ,115 ,049 ,634 ,027 ,800 -,140 ,277  -,222 ,043
cattle  -,103  ,336 -,050 ,622  -,065 ,543 -,006 ,953 ,038 ,732 -,078 ,546 ,005 ,966
trade goods  ,116 ,283 ,146  ,157  ,174 ,110 -,031 ,774 ,221 ,052 -,085 ,514  -,072 ,538
misc. goods  ,102  ,252 ,104 ,221 ,117 ,194 -,003 ,974 ,040 ,661 -,033 ,756 ,060 ,514
jobs  ,179  ,035 ,192  ,019  ,160 ,060 ,164 ,048 ,196 ,023 ,103 ,315 ,258 ,005
months of existence  ,181  ,032 ,191  ,018  ,163 ,052 ,142 ,093 ,006 ,943 -,026 ,797 ,171 ,051
number of products  ,180 ,155 ,195  ,109  ,159 ,200 ,161 ,213 ,226 ,088 ,029 ,850 ,190 ,169
market size  ,106 ,374 ,137  ,232  ,042 ,721 ,314 ,008 -,280 ,020 ,075 ,603 ,108 ,396
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5  Conclusions 
The regression analyses have shown that digital marketplaces should use the possibilities of 
international communication provided by the internet. It is vital for digital markets to offer the 
site in English and in some other ‘exotic’ languages. Many of these exotic languages are Eastern 
Europe languages and further investigations have shown, that a lot of trade, above all with used 
agricultural machinery, are traded between Western and Eastern Europe countries. 
The providing of information and news has, as expected, a negative impact on the probability of 
survival. Digital markets should focus on their main business to keep the website simple 
(Nielsen, 2004). There is enough information on the internet that is only one click aside. 
Also on the internet liquidity is essential for markets. As expected fees have a negative influence 
as well as the start-up strategy. An early start with a small turnover can create via recursive 
effects (everybody wants to trade where everybody trades) very quick big turnovers. The power-
law distribution shows that it is almost impossible to displace the winner in a winner-takes-all 
market from the top later on.  
The presumptions from some expert interviews and pre-tests that on digital agricultural markets 
only used machinery is traded in mentionable numbers also could be confirmed. 
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